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RADIO SPECTRUM AND THE DISRUPTIVE CLARITY OF
RONALD COASE1
Thomas W. Hazlett,2 David Porter,3 and Vernon Smith4
Nov. 23, 2009
Revised March 1, 2010
In the Federal Communications Commission,5 Ronald Coase exposed deep foundations via
normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled
scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise
endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners
perform an analogous function via the “price system.” The government solution was inefficient
unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the
price system would outperform. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications
policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took
until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been
held, 27,484 licenses sold, and $52.6 billion paid. The reform is a textbook example of economic
policy success. Herein, we examine Coase’s seminal 1959 paper on two levels. First, we note
its analytical symmetry, comparing administrative to market mechanisms under the assumption
of positive transaction costs. This fundamental insight had its beginning in Coase’s acclaimed
article on the firm,6 and continued with his subsequent treatment of social cost.7 Second, we
investigate why spectrum policies have stopped well short of the property rights regime that
Coase advocated, considering rent-seeking dynamics and the emergence of new theories
challenging Coase’s property framework. One conclusion is easily rendered: competitive
bidding is now the default tool in wireless license awards. By rule of thumb, about $17 billion in
U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article
appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.
JEL Categories: B31, D62, K11, K23, L51, L96, P14
Key Words: Ronald Coase, FCC, radio spectrum, property rights, cost-benefit analysis,
transaction costs, externalities, Coase Theorem, auctions
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Coase postulates that an economist who “is able to postpone by a week a
government program which wastes $100 million a year (what I consider a modest success) has,
by his action, earned his salary for the whole of his life.”8 By symmetry, this standard applies
when research brings a good law sooner. On that basis, Ronald Coase’s single paper, The
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”),9 has created such a bountiful account balance as
to safely capitalize the Economists’ Bank of Karma for generations to come.
The FCC paper was written in the spirit of Adam Smith’s WEALTH OF NATIONS. In
arguing a public policy position, Coase brought fundamentally new insights – disruptive clarities
-- to system dynamics. His meticulous reasoning was delivered in two healthy portions. The first
walked the reader through the argument for government planning as a solution to the so-called
externality problem, “externality” being a term not used by Coase in either the FCC paper or the
1960 “Social Cost” paper to follow.10 By focusing, rather, on how “harmful effects” were
rationally evaluated in economic markets, the generality of the spillover problem was revealed.
Social costs (externalities) were not exceptional cases and central planning was not a zero-cost
default.11 Governments and markets provide alternative forms of resource coordination;
determining the socially efficient mix requires symmetric appraisals. To posit government taxes
or controls as the costless default solution invokes the Nirvana Fallacy.12
The second source of disruptive clarity consisted of Coase’s deconstruction of the
government’s logic to assign property rights by fiat. Regulators and the U.S. Supreme Court had
confused the resource allocation question – how airwaves were to be used – with the rights
ownership question – who got to use them. Licenses were assigned by comparative hearings
8

Ronald H. Coase, Economists and Public Policy, in J. Fred Weston, ed., LARGE CORPORATIONS IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY (New York: NYU Press; 1975).
9
R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J LAW & ECON 1 (1959).
10
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J LAW & ECON 1 (1960). Coase explicitly avoided “externality” in
his attempt to show the generality of the resource allocation problem, breaking loose from the Pigouvian paradigm
that characterized products with spillovers as uniquely leading to market failure. He thereby focused on alternative
solutions to the resource problem, their costs, benefits and the government’s facilitative role in defining flexible
spectrum rights whose particular utilization could be valued and revalued in response to changing market and
technological developments. Pigouvian static externality and its subsequent mathematical treatment consistently
failed to motivate problem-solving processes that could answer the question of how and why government could
implement regulations (or taxes) that would be efficient where markets failed. See Ronald H. Coase, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; 1988); Carl Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 23 J
LAW & ECON 141 (April 1980).
11
Coase was keen to note such asymmetries in the economics literature. The object of his critique in the 1959 FCC
paper and then in his 1960, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J LAW & ECON 1 (1960) was A.C. Pigou’s influential THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). Coase’s The Marginal Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (Aug. 1946), found a
similar ‘zero cost for government policy’ assumption embedded in the work of Harold Hotelling, Stability in
Competition, 39 ECON J 41 (1929). Hotelling led many economists, including Abba Lerner and Paul Samuelson, to
postulate that declining average cost goods were efficiently produced under a regime extending subsidies to
suppliers who could thereby recover fixed costs while pricing outputs at marginal cost. Coase noted that the
approach implied that the required information for classifying products (and technologies used to produce them) was
freely available to the government, and that such subsidies (and the taxes required to fund them) would not distort
market feedback loops revealing which projects to fund.
12
Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J LAW & ECON 1 (April 1969).
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(“beauty contests”) on the grounds that chaos would reign in the airwaves were the rights sold
like other economic goods. Coase, observing licenses traded in secondary markets, saw the
creation of resource use rights and the assignment of said rights as separable.
Both lines of thought, institutional symmetry and the allocation-wealth dichotomy, would
figure prominently in Coase’s seminal 1960 analysis, generally considered the most frequently
cited research paper in the history of economics.13 Here we ponder issues more specifically
related to Coase’s work on radio spectrum, organized by the two general strands delineated. In
the first we evaluate spectrum policies under a positive transaction costs framework14 helping to
clarify recent critiques of Coase’s property rights policy proposal as either (a) difficult to
implement, given the stochastic nature of radio signals, or (b) obsolete, by virtue of newer digital
radio technologies that permit the use of smart wireless devices in “spectrum commons.” Both
attacks embed the Pigouvian asymmetry that the Coasean analysis exposed.
In this paper, however, we focus largely on the widely adopted policy reform promoted in
the Coase paper of 1959: wireless license auctions. When offered, the suggestion was treated
with extreme hostility. Regulators, policy makers, industry officials, and academic experts were
of the opinion that Coase was ignorant of the technical characteristics of radio spectrum and
incorrect as to his allegedly radical economic analysis. Auctions would not only be bad policy,
they would be impossible: airwaves were not susceptible to definition as property.
Coase’s responses were sound, yet we need not rehash them. Over 30 other countries
have run the experiment. On July 25, 1994, e.g., the Federal Communications Commission
commenced Auction No. 1, selling ten Narrowband Personal Communications Services (N-PCS)
licenses used for paging services. Aggregate winning bids of $617 million were generated.
While N-PCS failed to prove profitable,15 the government captured significant revenues and
moved to hold additional auctions. In March 1995, 99 broadband personal communications
services licenses (PCS) offering rights enabling competition with cellular operators were sold for
$7 billion. Through 2008, 73 FCC auctions were held, 27,484 wireless licenses sold, and $52.6
billion collected from winning bidders.16 See Appendix 1.
Auctions are now a well-established license assignment tool. “[S]pectrum auctions in the
US have been a great success,”17 a viewpoint widely shared by economists.18 Policy makers have
been energetic in claiming credit for their implementation. Indeed, wireless auctions now
constitute a textbook example of efficient regulatory reform. That Coase persevered in his
analytical enterprise when his work was questioned by all about him, is a tribute to his character,
the quality of his thought, and the substance of the economic model on which he built.

13

Thomas W. Hazlett, Ronald H. Coase, Chapter 1 in L. Cohen & J. Wright, eds. PIONEERS IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1 (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar; 2009), p. 1.
14
See Coase Theorem discussion below.
15
Paging services had been profitable, but were about to be displaced by cellular services. James B. Murray, Jr.
WIRELESS NATION (2001).
16
Statement by FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, News Release, Federal Communications Commission (March 18,
2009) and FCC website. For a summary of FCC reported auction results, see Appendix 1.
17
Mark Scanlan, Hiccups in US Spectrum Auctions, 25 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 689 (2001), 690.
18
See, e.g., Paul Milgrom, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004).
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Coase (1959) is far less famous a work than its elaboration in Coase (1960). That paper
was published pursuant to an invitation for a correction from JLE editors, who claimed that it
erred in its treatment of externalities. But the editors of this JOURNAL were wrong; the Federal
Communications Commission paper did not commit a “very interesting error”19 but offered a
lucid correction. We focus on two aspects of that analysis here:
(1) Symmetric evaluation of resource appropriation rules. Coase thought clearly about
the economics of damaging spillovers: they were byproducts of valuable activities and, as such,
were productive inputs subject to the same cost-benefit calculus as other resources. This
understanding led Coase to view legal rules not as palliatives for market failures, but as
mechanisms to discover trade-offs and achieve optimal outcomes. As soon as this task is made
clear, and the complex nature of the changing opportunities realized, it is apparent that a
government-managed process is simply one alternative, while markets form the standard default
in a modern economy. The role of economic analysis was not to assume away the problem by
the deus ex machina of no-cost public regulation, but to compare institutional options, apples-toapples. This common sense was uncommon, and it exposed the theoretical weakness of an
economic paradigm that proved market failure while assuming perfect governments.
(2) The public policy of auctioning radio frequency ownership rights. This signature
policy payoff of Coase’s 1959 paper begs the query: what other scholarly article has helped
trigger such enormous real-world changes? Competitive bidding for wireless license awards, a
reform uniformly traced to Coase (1959), began in New Zealand in 1989, in the U.S. in 1994,
and is now employed in dozens of countries. License assignments have proceeded as suggested,
eliminating costly delays and inefficiencies. Yet license auctions do not enable market allocation
of radio spectrum, and may in fact exacerbate the artificial scarcity imposed by regulation. U.S.
policy has, in recent years, been stymied by policy retrogression, under-allocating bandwidth for
mobile networks and rejecting liberal licenses in favor of “re-regulation.” Some of the problem
can be traced to Coase’s “bundle of rights” property agnosticism (addressed previously by
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith20), which now calls for amendment. We modestly propose a
Coase (1959) 2.0 Edition that incorporates fifty years of wireless market experience to extend the
efficiencies of license auctions to spectrum markets.
Coasean Disruption may be just getting started.

II. TWO SYMMETRIES AND ONE EMPIRICALLY TESTABLE PRESUMPTION
Coase (1959) brought clarity to resource economics by exposing two asymmetries in the
existing analysis, and then tucking these insights into the comfortable paradigm of Adam Smith’s
“invisible hand.” First, he revealed that cost “externalities” were not special cases but standard
economic inputs (or outputs). The social goal is not to eliminate (maximize) them but to

19

Coase (1993), p. 250.
Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics? 111 YALE L J 357
(Nov. 2001).
20
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maximize economic value.21 Second, the challenges encountered in doing so were not, uniquely,
market failures. They were real-world problems confronted by government regulators or private
owners. To assert that markets broke down when they failed to optimally deploy resources was
unhelpful; it said nothing about the relative success of some alternative set of rules. Direct
government regulation, tax/subsidy schemes, and private property rights – including the many
variants of each – were to be empirically evaluated to determine the best methods for
maximizing net social output. Third, Coase was not agnostic about where the analysis would
trend. Coase anticipated that full, fair, well-informed evaluations would find that decentralized
resource owners generally outperformed state diktat.
These insights profoundly influenced development of both theory and empirical research.
Yet, we note that much of the essential wisdom has yet to permeate ongoing economic
discussion, particularly in the policy realm in which the Coasean analysis began – radio spectrum
allocation. We address each of these contributions in this light.
a. Opportunity Costs of Reducing “Harmful Effects”
The U.S. Supreme Court argued in 1943 that, because “there is a fixed natural limitation
upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one another,”22 the
government was virtually forced to tightly control spectrum use. Without such central
administration, endemic interference between stations would produce chaos, what a later Court
would dub “a cacophony of competing voices.”23
Coase confronted the Supreme Court’s “misunderstanding of the nature of the
problem,”24 and made a remarkable discovery. First, the limited nature of frequencies simply
suggested a scarcity constraint. Countless other scarce resources were efficiently allocated by
“the price system.”25 Second, whatever spectrum use rights were assigned to wireless users
could be assigned by auctions rather than fiat. This was an idea proposed initially by University
of Chicago Law student Leo Herzel in 1951, who suggested this approach not after studying
under Milton Friedman or Aaron Director, but having read Abba Lerner’s THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTROL (1944).26 He was a good student: selling rights to the highest bidder was a logical way
for a socialist system to theoretically rationalize distribution. While then controversial, the
proposition cannot be in dispute: today the FCC does precisely this.27
21

It should be noted that A.C. Pigou’s ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) did not seek to categorically suppress
spillovers, but to incrementally tax or subsidize allocation choices so as to force decision makers to rationally
account for them. But where Pigou saw certain types of markets as subject to special policy interventions due to
“externalities,” Coase brought clarity by showing how the allocation of “harmful effects” (or “beneficial effects”)
was just another resource use question.
22
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 219 U.S. 190 (1943), p. 213.
23
Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
24
Coase (1959), p. 14.
25
“Land, labor and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for government regulation.” Coase (1959),
p. 14.
26
Ronald H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J LAW & ECON 239 (April 1993). See also, Leo Herzel,
“Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U CHIC L R 802 (1951).
27
The alert reader will note that the issue should not have been in dispute in 1959, either, as radio and television
stations traded freely in the marketplace – licenses and all. But such transactions did not appear to settle the matter,
as witnessed by the experts’ consensus denouncing the suggestion as hopelessly naïve.
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Coase’s third argument went much further. The government mitigated conflicts between
users by sharply limiting resource use – a regime that “relies exclusively on regulation and in
which private property and the pricing system play no part”28 – but could potentially achieve the
same objective far more efficiently. However it initially defined resource use rights, it could
allow users to recontract. Rights holders would then generate gains from trade, reducing
interference when neighboring frequency users paid them more than they gave up, either
accepting higher levels of airwave congestion or using mitigation techniques of their own –
improved technology, adjusted operations, or relocation. In this manner, users would act like
property owners, searching for ways to increase the value of their assets.
One of the purposes of the legal system is to establish that clear delimitation of
rights on the basis of which the transfer and recombination of rights can take
place through the market. In the case of radio, it should be possible for someone
who is granted the use of a frequency to arrange to share it with someone else,
with whatever adjustments to hours of operation, power, location and kind of
transmitter, etc., as may be mutually agreed upon; or when the right initially
acquired is the shared use of a frequency (and in certain cases the FCC has
permitted only shared usage), it should not be made impossible for one user to
buy out the rights of the other users so as to obtain an exclusive usage.29
This angle led Coase to see that the “externalities” were resource use conflicts entirely
analogous to the input costs that firms routinely incurred in producing valuable goods and
services. When clearly owned, they were rationally allocated. What made them seem to be of a
special character were circumstances making private ownership ill-defined.30 But those
circumstances were not automatically eliminated by state ownership, government regulation, or a
tax and subsidy scheme. Such approaches were just another way to deal with the same conflicts
over alternative resource use. The confusion was apparent in radio spectrum, where private
ownership was said to be impossible – but where regulators allegedly averted potential chaos by
issuing rules excluding most resource uses so that they could award protected, unobstructed use
rights to lucky licensees.
Coase saw that such rights could be more efficiently and transparently distributed by
auction. But that was a very limited reform, because “the enforcement of such detailed
regulations for the operation of stations as are now imposed by the Federal Communications
Commission would severely limit the extent to which the way the frequency was used could be
determined by the forces of the market.”31 If emission rights were broadened to constitute
ownership of frequencies, then private owners could deploy new technologies, services, and
business models, make deals across FCC-defined borders, adjust to changing circumstances, and
remix combinations of factors – including spectral inputs -- to discover the optimal level of
interference. In a dynamically changing world, such efficiencies would be continually updated.
28

Coase (1959), p. 34.
Coase (1959), p. 25.
30
Owners have, most essentially, the right to exclude others from appropriating their property. When lines cannot
be drawn to delineate borders, the effort to define rights suffers.
31
Coase (1959), p. 25.
29
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Such owners would not eliminate spillovers but be motivated to discover the efficient
levels and types. Some owners would buy neighboring (or distant) rights to emit, others sell, all
comparing costs to benefits in order to maximize the value of their slices. The result would be a
complex balancing. This was starkly at odds with the prevailing view that “harmful
interference” was destructive and would be endemic without pervasive regulatory management
of radio use. “It is sometimes implied that the aim of regulation in the radio industry should be
to minimize interference. But this would be wrong. The aim should be to maximize output.”32
Over time, spectrum ownership rights for certain types of licenses did expand, coming to
resemble private ownership of the bandwidth allocated to the FCC license. For mobile wireless
services, in particular, spectrum authorities in the U.S. and elsewhere have granted liberal rights
that delegate the choice of technologies, services, and business models largely to the licensee.
This regulatory reform has generated enormous value in assisting the efficient organization of
markets.33 The problem is that it has been parsimoniously applied, allotting relatively little
spectrum to liberal licenses, and continuing the use of the state property regime for allocations.
This provokes new challenges for economic policy, as discussed below.
b. Institutional Symmetry, and the Incredible Lightness of Stigler’s “Coase Theorem”
What has come to be called the Coase Theorem, courtesy of George Stigler,34 obscures
the Coasean analyses of 1959 and 1960 and leads to hazardous analytical detours.35 The
Stiglerian version is that, with zero transaction costs, resources will be efficiently deployed no
matter which party is endowed with ownership rights. This discussion, with these conditions,
appears in Coase (1960) not as a “theorem” but to critique the existing economic theory that
assumed away information and transactions cost when actions were taken by the state. Coase,
noting that the assumptions employed produced no market (or non-market) failure, then focused
on situations with positive transaction costs as the real analytical challenge. Efficient liability
rules would be found by comparing the more effective organizational rules when all costs were
included.
The confusion about Coase’s alleged reliance on the zero transaction cost assumption
obscures his central message, a diversion of enormous consequence. Such a default position is
easily toppled. The case for Pigouvian taxes or state property ownership is reconstituted via
demonstration of “transaction costs.” When evidence establishes this real world commonplace,
the case for market failure is made. The analysis shifts to consider what form of government
intervention is best employed to salvage the situation.
This does great violence to Coase’s analysis on multiple levels. First, it implicitly takes
“transaction costs” as a fixed feature of markets, exogenous from the legal rules or regulations
32

Coase (1959), p. 27.
Thomas W. Hazlett, Optimal Abolition of FCC Allocation of Radio Spectrum, 22 J ECON PERSP 103 (W 2008a).
34
“This proposition, that when there are no transaction costs the assignments of legal rights have no effect on the
allocation of resources among economic enterprises… I christened… the Coase Theorem.” George J. Stigler,
MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1988), p. 77.
35
This conclusion has been rendered by Ronald Coase (1988) himself.
33
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imposed by the state.36 This is clearly incorrect; the way property rights are defined has great
bearing on how such rights can be productively used in the marketplace.37 Second, when rights
are defined and distributed by the state in ways that hamper efficiency, the resulting “tragedy” is
properly a non-market failure. By refusing to undertake transactions that are, given their cost,
not worth the benefits sought, private property owners make efficient choices.38 What needs to
be fixed is the legal structure.
Third, Coase (1959) is crystal clear in its focus on symmetric comparison of the
(positive) transactions costs faced by government in parceling out limited use rights for wireless
applications, on the one hand, and an alternative system in which private entities owned the
frequencies. Either set of decision makers (regulators v. owners) would have to make choices
about the various ways the airwaves could be used, determining the cost of more emissions in
one enterprise against the restricted opportunities (due to greater “interference”) for others.
Coase saw that the “price system” was not free to set up or operate, and neither was it costless to
constrain potential wireless users with government restrictions. Costs were incurred when some
potentially valuable activities were barred due to a lack of authorization. Further, he saw that
while technical parameters helped determine the options the resource allocators faced, the
alternatives they selected were economic choices with costs and benefits. These were brushed
aside by policy experts claiming that the nature of radio waves made markets irrelevant.
Coase saw, for example, that the allocation of a given block of frequencies for television
broadcasting, to the exclusion of other wireless services, was not pre-determined by engineering
rules.39 It was a choice made by regulators that reflected their belief that the value obtained from
this use of bandwidth exceeded the value of the excluded opportunities. There were other ways
to perform the same coordination. They might render superior efficiencies.
In short, the technological facts did not dictate that government control resource
allocation. It was not sufficient to merely posit a market failure to establish a case for
administrative allocation. One had to consider the operational effectiveness of one system
against the alternatives. As sensible as the conclusion was, it was radical at the time. An FCC
36

“The exclusive use model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in bands where scarcity is relatively
high and transaction costs associated with market-based negotiation of access rights are relatively low. The
commons model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in bands where scarcity is relatively low and
transaction costs are relatively high.” Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum Policy Task Force Report
(Nov. 15, 2002), p. 5. We note the FCC’s confused terminology, referring to the private property model as
“exclusive use,” when such bandwidth constitutes the most intensively shared frequency spaces in economic terms,
and to unlicensed bands as “commons,” when such frequencies are regulated by governance rules imposed by the
FCC under administrative allocation.
37
For instance, a tragedy of the anti-commons ensues when rights are defined in fragmented, overlapping contours
that are prohibitively costly to reassemble. See Michael Heller, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (2008).
38
Harold Demsetz, Ownership and the Externality Problem, in T. Anderson & F. McChesney, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2003).
39
“[I]t is not clear why we should have to rely on the Federal Communications Commission rather than the
ordinary pricing mechanism to decide whether a particular frequency should be used by the police, or for a
radiotelephone, or for a taxi service, or for an oil company for geophysical exploration, or by a motion-picture
company to keep in touch with its film stars or for a broadcasting station. Indeed, the multiplicity of these varied
uses would suggest that the advantages to be derived from relying on the pricing mechanism would be especially
great in this case.” Coase (1959), p. 16.
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Chief Economist, Dallas Smythe, represented the prevailing view, dismissing market allocation
as imperfect and therefore irrelevant. Coase responded:
Professor Smythe also argued that the use of market controls depends on ‘the
economic assumption that there is substantially perfect competition in the
electronics field.’ This is a somewhat extreme view. An allocation scheme costs
something to administer, will itself lead to a misallocation of resources, and may
encourage some monopolistic tendencies – all of which might well make us
willing to tolerate a considerable amount of imperfect competition before
substituting an allocation scheme for market controls.40
Coase explained that there is no such thing as a free allocation system. The efficient
social choice considered the disparate options, symmetrically. That is not a result of the zero
transaction cost assumption, but its opposite.
c. The Market Efficiency Default
While Coase went “looking for results,”41 he was not agnostic. He analyzed radio
spectrum in 1959 as Adam Smith had analyzed commodity markets in 1776. The “invisible
hand” had much to offer. A CBS broadcast executive expressed surprise when asked at a 1958
congressional hearing about the possibility that the “avenues of the air” should be sold by the
Government such that “the taxpayer would be getting the proceeds.”42 Coase delights in quoting
the broadcaster’s response, “[t]his is a new and novel concept,”43 offering the retort: “This ‘novel
theory’ (novel with Adam Smith) is, of course, that the allocation of resources should be
determined by the forces of the market rather than as a result of government decisions.”44 He
then further reveals his empirical priors:
Quite apart from the malallocations which are the result of political pressures, an
administrative agency which attempts to perform the function normally carried
out by the pricing mechanism operates under two handicaps. First of all, it lacks
the precise monetary measure of benefit and cost provided by the market.
Second, it cannot, by the nature of things, be in possession of all the relevant
information possessed by the managers of every business which uses or might use
radio frequencies, to say nothing of the preferences of consumers for the various
goods and services in the production of which radio frequencies could be used. In
fact, lengthy investigations are required to uncover part of this information, and
decisions of the Federal Communications Commission emerge only after long
delays, often extending to years.
To simplify the task, the Federal
Communications Commission adopts arbitrary rules.45

40
41
42
43
44
45

Coase (1959), p. 16.
Interview with Thomas W. Hazlett, REASON (Jan. 1997).
Coase (1959), p. 17.
Ibid.
Coase (1959), p. 18.
Ibid
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Having eliminated confusion as to “technical issues” and “externalities,” Coase
demonstrated that FCC planning mechanisms did not import special skills or avoid critical tradeoffs. Rather, the agency was unlikely to exhibit comparative advantage in allocating bandwidth.
Competitive markets would reveal opportunity costs and reward entrepreneurial efforts to
identify potential benefits from innovation, improving social coordination. In this, Coase
operated mainly from theory, not from his own detailed examination of alternative regulatory
models. With the liberalization of certain important wireless licenses over the past half-century,
however, the evidence is overwhelming: the normative recommendation was correct.46 Coase’s
priors proved a testament to his ability to apply economics to markets and to the power of his
theoretical model.
d. The Contemporary Radio Spectrum Policy Debate Lags Coase (1959)
Two recent objections to private property rights in spectrum are noteworthy. The first is
that such rights are sufficiently difficult to define that a premature shift to spectrum markets may
be worse than the inefficiencies inflicted by administrative allocation. The second is that the
exclusive ownership rights presumed efficient by Coase may, given advanced wireless
technologies, no longer be socially useful. Today’s smart radios can steer their way around
“harmful interference” through computational power, such that the coordination of property
rights is unhelpful and the overhead associated with ownership wasteful. In forcing transactions
between rights holders, it imposes the costs of the price system when more productive
alternatives – such as “spectrum commons” – are available.
Both assertions fail to embed the symmetry of the Coasean analysis. When that is
restored, and marketplace evidence appropriately weighed, either argument collapses. We
discuss each in turn.
i. Private property rights are difficult to define.
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Phil Weiser and Dale Hatfield write:
Numerous commentators have built on Coase’s wisdom and charted paths to
facilitate markets in spectrum. However, defining rights to use spectrum is far more
difficult than ordinarily suggested. Problems such as geographic spillover and
adjacent channel spillover make it much more difficult to define rights to spectrum
and to determine how to measure when those rights have been transgressed.
Unlike the case of real property, which is measured in two or three dimensions,
there are as many as seven dimensions by which electromagnetic frequency can be
measured, and the best way to measure these dimensions remains unsettled. Many
decisions remain, such as whether to use statistical models of radio wave
propagation, actual measurement of interference, or some combination of the two to
determine the scope of rights in spectrum.47

The complexity of predicting the path of radio emissions, and then their ownership, is
then said to present a problem for policies promoting spectrum markets. But the question is not
whether resource ownership is more difficult to define than with, say, real property, but whether
competitive markets can out-perform government regulators in the cost-information discovery
task central to allocating radio spectrum resources. The complexities of spectrum relative to
other forms of property are not the issue.48 If that unique complexity is well stated (it is unlikely
to be, given that the many complications of real property law, not to mention those of legal
regimes for water, space, the sea, fisheries, underground oil reserves, or intellectual property),
then it is equally an issue for all. Yet, “the difficult policy choices ahead” in spectrum are
categorically focused on the costs of private property rights. Fortuitously, this approach is
rejected in the property rights literature Coase triggered.49
Property rules are always tailored to circumstances. If it is true that “[a] property rights
system that relies heavily on ex ante predictions rather than ex post findings of actual
interference would, involve several sacrifices,”50 and those sacrifices are more costly than the
alternative, the implication is that the legal rules should be light on ex ante definitions and rely
more on ex post adjudication.51 The implicit presumption that private property rules cannot
achieve this efficient turn is to attack a straw man. And, again, the question is whether the state
property regime will do better.
Coase, Meckling & Minasian specifically addressed the uncertain boundaries of spectrum
property rights in their long suppressed Rand study (written in 1962), which served as the
47
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empirical source of the argument that private property rights were (are) non-viable. “Those
concerned with policy in this area seem to have assumed that the delimitation of property rights
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, and consequently that it was inconceivable that
there could be a market in radio frequencies…”52 This reflected a misunderstanding of property
rights, which do not define things but the rights of economic agents to “do certain things.”53
To help coordinate the productive use of resources, rules limit some activities in order to
enhance others. Vesting a broadcast station with the exclusive right to operate a television
station at a particular location at a fixed power level for specified hours to be supported only by
advertisements (no subscription fees) under the administrative allocation regime is one way of
doing that. But social costs are incurred to the degree that the services excluded by the
regulations have value. Indeed, the FCC’s parsimonious spectrum use rights left large (and
growing) values foreclosed, addressing the problem of stochastic radio waves by leaving wide
spaces between broadcast channels such that the vast majority of TV slots are today unoccupied
– even after the analog TV turn-off some 83% of local TV channels host no broadcasts.54
Regulators do not see these channels as wasted; it is how they control interference. It is, by
consensus, a hugely expensive way to coordinate wireless services in the TV band,55 airwaves
that could generate over $1 trillion in net present value consumer welfare gains if the remaining
TV stations were moved to more efficient (cable or satellite) delivery platforms.56
Hence, the stochastic nature of radio waves does not present a challenge to private
property rights, but to any legal rights structure. “If radiation cannot in fact be confined
geographically, neither the FCC nor any other government agency, nor a market system can
make it confinable so long as it is emitted.”57 This contribution of Coase (1959) is not well
integrated into today’s discussion. To wit, Hatfield & Weiser write:
Compounding the issues related to limits on signal strength, we also underscored
that the actual signal strength at the geographic boundary can vary significantly. In
particular, depending on the height of the receiving antenna as well as the time and
location in the immediate area of the receiver (vis‐à‐vis their effects on radio
propagation), results can vary widely. To emphasize this point, we analyzed the
extreme but historically important case of AM radio. In so doing, we described the
wide changes in signal strength due to diurnal, seasonal, solar cycle, and path
location variations, concurring with [Charles] Jackson’s conclusion that introducing
a property‐rights regime in the AM radio band along the lines used for real property
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would face enormous—and likely insurmountable—difficulties.58
But the “enormous…. difficulties” encountered when signals randomly skip through the
atmosphere, cited as debilitating to market owners, equally constrain the choices made by
regulators. FCC licensing policies characteristically over‐protect against interference, allocate far
too few AM broadcasting facilities,59 deny licenses to entrants,60 and block technological innovation
that would increase market competitiveness.61 Not only must these costs be considered in the
choice of regime, so must the myriad legal options for crafting efficient private property rules.
Where the FCC has defined AM radio broadcasting rights, a property system can be enabled
by loosening existing restrictions on the template already used in practice. Spectrum allocated to
licenses would be the de jure or de facto property of the licensee, and rights holders would be able
to exclude others from encroaching on the use of such resources according to precedents in place
(in property law or regulatory rulings). Where needlessly expensive contentiousness is observed
or reasonably anticipated, it may be mitigated with ex post adjudication devices that lower costs.
This evolution of property rights is, indeed, how the liberal license model, analogous to private
property in radio spectrum, has been adopted in most countries for mobile wireless services.62

These exclusive ownership rights are used far more intensely, and attract far more investment in
complementary network infrastructure, providing empirical support for Coase’s priors.
ii. Coase’s property rights are obsolete in the digital era.

The property rights approach to radio spectrum has been challenged in many law review
articles over the past decade.63 The argument for exclusive rights is characterized as an
anachronism appropriate to an earlier day when radios were primitive and interference was acute.
Now, with newer wireless devices, there is little need for rationing spectrum. Autonomous radio
users can easily navigate through congested airspace; indeed, airwaves that were scarce
resources requiring choices between alternative uses will now accommodate all.64
Citing the popular use of unlicensed bands hosting cordless phones, wi-fi modems, and
other radio devices operated with non-exclusive use rights, such scholars argue that private
spectrum property should be largely abandoned in favor of “spectrum commons.” According to
Yochai Benkler:
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It [is] now possible to change our approach, and instead of creating and enforcing
a market in property rights in spectrum blocks, we could rely on a market in smart
radio equipment that would allow people to communicate without anyone having
to control “the spectrum”… This approach has been called a “spectrum
commons” approach, because it regards bandwidth as a common resource that all
equipment can call on, subject to sharing protocols, rather than as a controlled
resource that is always under the control of someone, be it a property owner, a
government agency, or both.65
Citing “evidence of a massive crack in the Coasian spectrum theory,”66 another writer suggests
that “it is not a stretch to propose that Coasian spectrum markets might be an outmoded relic of
the era in which they were conceived.”67
The argument proves uncompelling. In theory, the unlicensed bands are neither “open
access” nor “spectrum commons” but government allocations, with rules imposed by regulators
to mitigate conflicts. The rules embed a licensing scheme applied to equipment; no radio may be
used unless authorized for unlicensed operation by the FCC. Approvals mandate power limits
and technology restrictions. Rather than demonstrate the end of scarcity, the use of such bands
clearly shows how rivalrous uses continue to contend for valuable bandwidth. Only by virtue of
the government’s restrictions are users of non-exclusive rights protected from tragedy of the
commons. This method of allocating spectrum, however, exhibits the traditional infirmities of
administrative allocation. Spectrum is set-aside for unlicensed use, and rules to govern access
are crafted, under political choices that generally lack the relevant price data or profit incentives.
In practice, unlicensed allocations are not eclipsing liberal licensed bands, which
dominate economic activity.68 The providers of mobile services generate over $150 billion in
consumer surplus annually,69 overwhelming wireless applications supplied with unlicensed
spectrum. Were unlicensed bands eclipsing exclusive spectrum rights as per the march of
technology, carriers would save billions of dollars by shifting their mix of inputs to increasingly
favor unlicensed bandwidth. The 2008 FCC auction of 700 MHz licenses generated $19 billion
at the highest prices, adjusted for bandwidth, yet received by the government for mobile
licenses.70 More fundamentally, exclusive ownership rights support economic coordination,
promote investments to create networks complementing airwaves and dramatically increasing
their productivity. No other rights regime, whether for traditional licenses or unlicensed
bandwidth, comes close to matching, let alone displacing, this value-generating result.
In short, there is no market migration away from private property rights. Indeed, the
most binding regulatory constraint is the parsimonious allocation of liberally licensed bandwidth.
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Coase’s 1959 analysis survives the digital era, continuing to prescribe the correct policy path:
allow spectrum resources to be owned by responsible economic agents.71

III. THE INTELLECTUAL PIVOT FOR AUCTIONS
When Ronald Coase began his investigation of public policy for radio spectrum,
communications policy experts in the U.S. widely held that radio spectrum rights were optimally
held by the state: markets would under-produce “public interest” outputs. Grounded in the
genesis of spectrum allocation for radio broadcasting, policy makers opposed market-driven
rights allocations because they would “emasculate ‘socially desirable’ censorship.”72 But many
analysts went much further, asserting that spectrum could only be held by the government.
Property rights could not be auctioned because they could not be defined. “Rights to use the
spectrum are not susceptible to legal enforcement as are private property rights.”73 Airwave
spillovers led to economic externalities, which would destroy market allocation – that was the
theory-driven story. When Coase explained the actual problem as delimiting rights, which could
be achieved using one set of rules or the other (public ownership v. private ownership), the
response from academic and policy experts was emphatically negative.
Invited to the FCC to testify about his novel approach to spectrum allocation in 1959, the
first question posed was Commissioner Philip Cross’ query: “Tell us, Professor, is this all a big
joke?”74 In 1962, the Rand Corporation commissioned Coase and two other economists to write
a detailed proposal to implement the suggested policy regime. Rand then suppressed the 200page report when the think tank was warned of its potentially explosive political implications.75
In 1965, a Federal Communications Commission official explained why the response to Coase
71
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was so uniformly hostile: “After the initial shock of rationally considering the use of the pricing
mechanism in frequency allocations, the virtually unanimous view of communications specialists
would be that the multiplicity of users both national and international…, the interference
characteristics of radio with signals at relatively low energy levels interfering at diverse points
many hundreds of miles away… and the hundreds of thousands of licensees involved in addition
to the many millions of consumers make the pricing mechanism unworkable for frequency
allocation.”76 When, in the mid-1970s, Coase’s call for auctions was (finally) taken up by an
FCC member, it was promptly ridiculed by two fellow Commissioners who announced that its
adoption garnered the same odds “as those on the Easter Bunny in the Preakness.”77
The intense opposition to competitive bidding was curious to Coase. The arguments
were made that (1) radio emission rights could not be defined to be sold; (2) even if such rights
could be traded, market assignments would under-supply public interest outputs like local news
or educational programming. But the first premise was demonstrably untrue, as the licenses that
were assigned by regulators were routinely re-assigned by the price system; secondary market
transactions had been revealing the existence of substantial rents since the 1920s. And the
second seemed to Coase to clash with common sense. The conditions placed on licensees could
be imposed in a regime where licenses were distributed by auction, with rents (reduced by the
expected costs of the embedded obligations) captured for the public. The objection to market
assignments seemed simply to be in error.
Here Coase missed the political dynamics. One advantage of an auction regime is that it
improves transparency, forcing regulators to state terms and conditions. But policy makers and
broadcasters are able to generate mutual gains – trading rents for regulatory influence over
content -- by incomplete revelation of terms.
Policy makers had good reasons to fear a loss of control over broadcasting were auctions
to be implemented. Assigning rights to radio and television stations by competitive bidding
rather than administrative fiat eliminated non-arms length transactions and thereby reduced the
scope for “regulation by raised eyebrow” – a term of art at the FCC.78 The license was
commonly referenced as a quid pro quo, with rents awarded to licensees in exchange for “public
interest” outputs.79 In reality, the enumerated social benefits rarely materialized. By the FCC’s
own admission, the “public interest” programming gambit was a failure, producing a “vast
wasteland,” as FCC Chairman Newton Minow famously described TV fare in 1961.80 In 1976,
Commissioner Glen O. Robinson likened broadcast regulation to “a charade—a wrestling match
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full of fake grunts and groans but signifying nothing.’’81 As economist Bruce Owen deduced
from the empirical evidence, the FCC “does not live up to its own theory of regulation.”82
Yet the lack of productive outputs did not mean that the regime was not a success in
achieving certain politically popular ends. Evidence of that success was seen in the extreme
hostility to auctions cited above, and in the fact that is was particularly concentrated among those
who benefited the most from the exercise of power over assignments -- committees in Congress
overseeing FCC operations. While budget and appropriations committees had long sought to
obtain revenues from licenses, the respective commerce committees (overseeing
telecommunications regulation) blocked reform. In Feb. 1987, Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH), a
member of the Senate Commerce Committee, sprayed cold water on the Federal
Communications Commission proposal to authorize license sales because it ``will aid
monopolies…. You won't get anywhere with this, so why don't you go back to the drawing
board?''83 In May 1987, Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-HI), Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on
Communications, rebuffed a colleague, Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-FL), Chair of the Senate Budget
Committee, telling him that an auction “undercuts the fundamental tenet in communications
policy that the airwaves are a limited public resource [and it] is inappropriate to sell such a
resource to the highest bidder.”84 The Chair of the House Commerce Committee, John Dingell
(D-MI), then introduced 1989 legislation with a section: “PROHIBITION OF SPECTRUM
AUCTION.”85 The bill was simply a blunt object waved in a threatening manner; the FCC had no
statutory authority to conduct auctions.
Yet this political animosity was dissipating over time. Broadcasting – the object of the
“fundamental tenet in communications policy” – was being eclipsed in economic importance by
emerging wireless telephone services. In 1993, with U.S. policy for second generation (2G)
services lagging, with a newly unified national government (the Democratic Party controlled
both the Presidency and the Congress for the first time in 12 years), with the transparent
squandering of billions of dollars in rents in the 1984-89 cellular license lotteries as predicate,
the system was primed for reform.86 Congress authorized auctions in the 1993 budget,
mandating that they be used to distribute PCS, but not broadcasting, licenses and gave the
Federal Communications Commission a one-year deadline to initiate competitive bidding.87
The demonstration effect was powerful. Once sales commenced, distributing licenses
economically, the consensus of the communications experts was exposed and broken.88 The
81
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burden shifted: what was to justify a system in which licenses were not assigned to high bidders?
Moreover, the new flow of federal receipts shifted the political equilibrium. Stalwart opponents
of auctions now sought to take credit. Pedestrians in Washington D.C. found it hazardous to
inadvertently stroll between a television news crew and an FCC Chairman brandishing an
auction check for the Treasury.89 The Commission issued notices boasting that it was a
government profit center.90 While tantamount to a real estate agent assuming credit for the
market value of the property sold, the claim did possess a germ of historical veracity: prior to
1994, the Government had squandered such rents in favor of “beauty contests” and lotteries.91
Worse for democratic institutions, government policy makers were enmeshed in a
fundamental conflict of interest, setting rules for electronic speech, including content regulations
such as the “equal time rule” (imposed by statute in 1927) and the “fairness doctrine” (imposed
by the FCC in 1949), while their electoral fortunes relied on the information supplied to the
public by these media outlets. Even in arms length oversight, regulators were constrained to
evaluate licensees with regard to political considerations. And not always were regulations arms
length. Texas Congressman Lyndon Johnson amassed a personal fortune by forming a political
alliance with the chairman of the FCC, befriending staffers of the agency, and then manipulating
regulatory decisions to land his wife under-priced ownership of TV and radio stations – a process
called by one observer, “government between friends.”92 Later, when President of the United
States, “Johnson would summon the appropriate CBS personnel to the White House to complain
that CBS was charging one of his TV stations too much for syndicated programming.” The
problem was solved when CBS News President Frank Stanton “told his staff to furnish the
program to the station free.”93 During the Nixon years, networks considered implicit threats of
license renewal problems in response to purported media bias to be just another cost of doing
business.94 Coase, aware of the potential for such corruption and First Amendment compromise,
argued for competitive bidding as an antidote.95
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The policy regime switch exposed a fundamental fact: the use of auctions was not
revolutionary. Licenses that had been defined by policymakers before would continue to be
defined, if governments so desired, in precisely the same manner. The traditional license, as
allocated to television broadcasting, affords a right to operate a wireless business as strictly
defined by the license. Transmission technology, business models (ad supported, not
subscription), services (broadcast video, not two-way broadband), and even the location of
transmitters were specified by regulators. Indeed, for TV and many other services, it still is:
“almost all spectrum licenses have restrictions that specify the particular use to which bandwidth
must be put.”96 The auction reform formally leaves this regime intact.
U.S. auctions have generally produced results anticipated by Coase. Large numbers of
licenses have been sold, substantial revenues have been generated for the government, and
blocks of spectrum have been more efficiently aggregated, invigorating retail competition.97
Similar licenses have sold for similar prices, adjusting for timing and other financial differences,
and for synergies between licenses.98 And with over $52 billion in revenues collected by the U.S.
Government, perhaps about $17 billion in additional economic welfare has been delivered via the
public financing bonus. This occurs when rents are extracted that displace revenues generated
by activity-distorting taxation, the rule of thumb associating each dollar of public receipts with
approximately 33¢ in (additional) lost benefits.99

IV. EFFICIENCIES OF LICENSE AUCTIONS
Assigning wireless licenses by competitive bidding has markedly improved the
administrative process wherein spectrum rights are awarded to licensees.100 Efficiencies include
private sector savings on lobbying activity associated with “comparative hearings,” contests to
establish the “public interest” bona fides of rival bidders for licenses. They are also an
improvement over lotteries, authorized for use by the U.S. Congress in 1981 as a compromise
(Congress not wanting to grant the Reagan Administration auction authority), which were
every meeting. The networks badly want to have these kinds of discussions which they said they had had with other
Administrations but never with ours. They told me any time we had a complaint about slanted coverage for me to
call them directly. [CBS President Ed] Paley said that he would like to come down to Washington and spend time
with me anytime that I wanted. M In short, they are very much afraid of us and are trying hard to prove they are
‘good guys.’" Quoted in David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L J 213
(May 1975), p. 246.
95
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96
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ECON & POL’Y 256 (2006), 262.
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(Oct. 9, 1997), 22.
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Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions, 6 J ECON & MGT STRAT 497 (1997); Patrick Moreton & Pablo Spiller,
What’s In the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications Commission’s Broadband Personal
Communications Service Spectrum Auctions, 41 J L & ECON 677 (Oct. 1998).
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curiously conducted under the fiction that those applying for random selection were actual phone
companies. Thousands of new “phone companies” materialized, on paper, submitting detailed
engineering drawings and proof of operating experience, such evidence purchased from
consulting firms and technology suppliers at considerable cost.101 This charade created such
massive filings, with hundreds of thousands of applications submitted for 1,468 cellular licenses
(two issued in each of 734 franchise areas), that an FCC warehouse storing these documents
collapsed. Between $500 million and $1 billion was squandered in rent seeking waste.102
But the largest costs were borne by consumers, technology suppliers, and investors after
the non-auctioned licenses were assigned. Given U.S. regulators’ penchant for issuing large
numbers of geographically (and, often, spectrally) small licenses, extensive secondary market
transactions were needed to assembly efficient spectrum blocks. To serve a national marketplace
with mobile wireless, e.g., operators have acquired literally thousands of licenses – more than
50,000 FCC wireless licenses are today held by mobile carriers (of which there are just four
national operators).103 Such aggregations have been expensive; an estimated $190 million on
brokers’ fees alone was spent in 1991 in cellular license deals.104
More deleteriously, it took years to collect assets, delaying and degrading services.105
The use of auctions in the primary market has speeded this process, reducing social expense.
Paul Milgrom references the general set of transaction costs involved in reconfiguring license
rights in secondary markets in writing:
The history of the US wireless telephone service offers direct evidence that the
fragmented and inefficient initial distribution of rights was not quickly correctable
by market transactions. Despite demands from consumers for nationwide
networks and the demonstrated successes of similarly wide networks in Europe,
such networks were slow to develop in the United States.106
Such post-assignment delays were mitigated with the use of auctions. In the important
PCS A, B auction, held from Dec. 1994 to March 1995, one firm – Sprint – emerged with 29 of
51 licenses needed for complete national coverage using 30 MHz. This yielded Sprint – a new
mobile entrant -- direct access to 147 million potential subscribers (more than half U.S.
population).107
With roaming agreements, themselves easier to execute given the
defragmentation of licenses elsewhere, Sprint began providing services by late 1995. This foray,
along with additional regional network consolidations enabled in the PCS A/B auction and the
101
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formation of Nextel,108 disrupted the existing cellular duopoly imposed by virtual of the fact that
just two FCC licenses had been issued in each local franchise area.
The auction exposed the fact that mobile licenses were complements; significant value
was created when adjacent licenses were purchased by bidders.109 Productive gains were
possible via the assembly of efficient packages, eliminating uneconomic rights distributions.110
Of course, PCS licenses also enabled competitive entry, ending the cellular duopoly. Large
gains to consumers ensued. Wireless carriers undercut terrestrial long-distance charges,
encouraging substitution from fixed to mobile networks. The key marketing innovation began in
May 1998 with instantly popular digital “one rate plans,” offering large buckets of “nationwide
minutes.”111
As seen in Figure 1, average revenue per minute fell from over 50 cents prior to the PCS
auction to just 6.4 cents in 2007, a nominal reduction of 87% -- at least 70% below the pre-PCS
trend. Most of this sharp decline was achieved via a huge increase in minutes of use, encouraged
by flat rate pricing (capped during peak calling times, unlimited off-peak).
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FIG. 1. U.S. CELLULAR RETAIL PRICES BEFORE AND AFTER PCS AUCTIONS112
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Competitive bidding for licenses may have encouraged regulators to continue to divvy up
airwave rights in highly fragmented parcels. In 73 auctions conducted by the FCC, July 1994
through November 2008, the Commission sold some 27,484 licenses.113 This radical (and
globally distinct) fragmentation of licenses has been partially mitigated by the implementation of
auctions.114
Revenues generated by license auctions have assumed both economic and political
importance. To economists, the rents transferred to governments create public financing
efficiencies. Each dollar raised theoretically offsets another dollar which would have – but for
the auction receipts – been raised via taxes. Because taxes generally distort economic activity,
funds raised cost society more than they buy for the government. Capturing spectrum rents can
be an efficient way to pay for public expenditures.
But not if the spectrum allocation system distorts wireless markets in order to increase
bidding receipts. There is a sharp conflict between government maximizing its revenue as a
monopoly seller, and an efficient allocation for long run income creation benefiting the economy
(and, indirectly, generating additional tax collections). Because license revenues are easily
dominated by consumer surplus generated by the wireless services enabled (Hazlett & Muñoz
2009), it is penny-wise and pound foolish to restrict competition (or, equivalently, delay license
sales) in order to goose up auction receipts. This, unfortunately, is a lesson that must still be
learned by the political system, as discussed below.
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CTIA data.
FCC website. The number is slightly inflated by the re-auction of some licenses.
Aggregation problems exacerbated by the lack of combination bidding are discussed below.
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V. INEFFICIENCIES IN THE LICENSE AUCTION REGIME
1. Bidder Collusion
FCC auction procedures initially gave bidders incentives to signal – and collude – by
using bids that detailed what markets they were most keenly interested in winning.
Communications were achieved by placing bids that used the last three decimal places to mark
desired territory. A bid of $36,000,326, say, would indicate a decided interest in the bidder
winning License No. 326. This bidding strategy was labeled the trailing digits play.
To eliminate this practice, the FCC no longer allows bidders to submit their own
(custom) bid amounts; they must select from incremental bids specified by the FCC.115 Other
methods employed by bidders may signal their intentions, however. One of the most pervasive
strategies, which has garnered attention in the economics literature, is that of jump bidding. This
strategy registers bids one or more increments above the prescribed minimum. The approach is
designed to signal the strength of the bidder, “scaring away” rivals contesting a license. It may
also secure a license for which the bidder may not have the highest value, but where a higher
bidder’s valuation proves less than the winning bid plus the minimum increment.116 Another
strategy, euphemistically called upping yourself, occurs when a bidder increases their own bid
despite being the standing high bid on a license. Ordinarily, this is viewed as a patently
irrational action in auction theory. Yet, in FCC license auctions, it has been associated with the
same signaling strategies as those associated with jump bidding.
The strategy of retaliatory bidding entails placing bids on the licenses bid upon by rivals,
restricting the rival’s ability to bid on the licenses the bidder actually desires to win. For
example, if a bidder is interested in license A and another bidder is interested in licenses A and
B, the first bidder can drive up the price of B, signaling that the second bidder should cease
bidding on A. Many bidding strategies have emerged, and a host of FCC rules on bidder
eligibility and withdrawal have been adopted in response. Insofar as collusive strategies arise,
they stem from regulator’s provision of full information on bidder identities, bids submitted, and
other information. Banks et al. (2002)117 make a case for not providing such information in
these types of open auctions. Beginning in 2008 (Auction 73) the FCC adopted anonymous
bidding, revealing only the number of bidders who place bids for each license and the amount of
the current highest.118 Such non-disclosure rules have benefits but also costs, in that firm
executives are bound by extensive FCC regulations regarding inter-firm communications, rules
adopted to protect the secrecy of bidder identities.
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While many of the flaws in the FCC rules were anticipated by the experimental
economics literature it appears many of the flaws are fixable and have been, fixed. “A close
examination of the problems experienced in the US in the middle of the 1990s, however, shows
that they were relatively minor glitches to a very successful program of spectrum assignment.”119
That is the mainstream view, and it garners justifiable support. However, as we will argue
below, one major change in the auction format, combinatorial bidding, should be implemented.
2. Bidding Credits for Designated Entities
In the 1993 legislation authorizing auctions, Congress mandated that the FCC conduct its
competitive bidding procedures so as to fully include “designated entities” (DEs). These were
defined as four types of companies: small businesses, rural telephone carriers, minority-owned
firms, female-owned firms. Due to a U.S. Supreme Court case sharply limiting the use of
government preferences assigned on the basis of race or gender,120 the FCC dropped the latter
two categories. Small businesses and rural carriers, as defined by the Commission, would be
eligible for favorable treatment to effectively subsidize their bidding as per a policy crafted in
1995.121 The rationale was that these companies were handicapped in accessing capital markets;
in an open auction without such government protection, larger firms would out-bid them. Both
bidding credits were extended, and license set-asides (barring bids from non-DEs) were imposed
to remedy this situation.
This was not well thought out. Put yourself in the position of a bidder who could use
credits (other peoples’ money) to supplement whatever would have been your cash bid. The
bidding credits induced over-bidding in auctions, producing winning bids much higher than
those registered for similar licenses awarded without DE credits. That the bidding credits were
extended as low-interest long-term loans exacerbated the effect; bids net of the credits were far
above the non-subsidized bids in previous PCS auctions. The ensuing defaults and bankruptcies
that occurred were a direct product of the fact that the firms granted such credits were neither
efficient service providers nor, therefore, strong bidders. By encouraging awards to inefficient
firms, the main purpose of the auction was thwarted. And it fails to incorporate the salient fact
that, by sacrificing up front auction revenue in favor of efficiency increases (in service markets)
and wealth creation, much greater downstream government tax revenue will be captured.
This reveals the severe tension between auctions and preferences. When a “small
business” is afforded a bidding credit, it attracts more intense bidding, wiping out the advantage
afforded. This outcome was virtually assured by the designation “small business,” and the rules
that the FCC used to define such entities: firms with limited financial resources (including
collateral). This approach was explicitly taken to help firms that would otherwise have difficulty
obtaining credit in order to bid for licenses. But the reason that firms without financial standing
have limited access to capital markets is that such firms are relatively bad bets.
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In the 1996 PCS C block auction (No. 5), the FCC saw winning bids more than twice as
high, net of bidding credits, as had been paid in the (unsubsidized PCS A and B) auction the year
before.122 DE bidders extended 40% bidding credits. (In other words, if a DE bids 100, that bid
is registered as 140 in the auction but, were the DE bidder to win, would pay just 100.) And
DEs were allowed to pay winning bids over ten years, interest-only for the first four, at an
interest rate equal to that on long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds (then about 6.5%). This constituted
a considerable financing subsidy for firms’ whose cost of capital would have been about 14%.123
Moreover, it created a lucrative financial option. Bidders could bid aggressively to win,
make their first interest-only payment, then see whether license value exceeded what they had
bid. If so, they would finance their network, build-out, and then pay the government. If not,
they could declare bankruptcy and seek protection from their creditor – the federal government.
Indeed, they could ask a bankruptcy court to reduce their obligation. That is what the largest C
block winners did.124 GWI bid about $1.1 billion for licenses, but received permission from a
U.S. Bankruptcy Court to satisfy its debt by paying just $200 million. Nextwave, having
emerged the largest PCS C winner in 1996 with $4.8 billion in licenses, ended up paying just
$1.6 billion in cash to the FCC – two-thirds of which was paid, without interest, in 2004.125
By exacerbating winner’s curse, and driving licenses to inefficient suppliers, the FCC
destroyed huge increments of consumer welfare. PCS spectrum was allocated in 1989-94.
Auction 5 (concluded May 1996) assigned C licenses and Auction 11 (concluded January 1997)
assigned F licenses. It then took until settlements and transactions conducted in 2004 and FCC
Auction 58 (concluded February 2005) to assign most C and F block license rights to operators.
This deprived the mobile market of about 30 MHz of nationwide bandwidth, raising prices to
retail customers. The loss in efficiency of this input truncation amounted to at least $65
billion.126 This debacle, if attributed to the initiation of auctions, could well leave the policy with
a net social value of less than zero.
The irony was that economists had greeted the bidding credits program enthusiastically,
on the grounds that it would increase net auction receipts. By subsidizing rivals to established
incumbent carriers, such carriers would be forced to bid more aggressively. The designated
entities would not emerge victorious but serve as bidding shills used by “the house” to drive up
the stakes of the game.127 The analysis implicitly assumed that the government could calibrate
the credits to perfectly strike a balance, driving up receipts without awarding licenses to substandard service suppliers. Prescience is an ambitious assumption for public policy. When
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violated, weak bidders actually win licenses, perform relatively poorly, and reduce consumer
welfare. This is what happened endemically and sensationally in the PCS-C and PCS-F block
auctions, as described, resulting in extremely large social losses. While the FCC no longer
extends credit to winning bidders, it continues to favor weak bidders with bidding credits, raising
the probability that productive efficiencies will be lost and output markets will exhibit degraded
performance.128
3. License Fragmentation and the Lack of Package Bids
License fragmentation continues to unnecessarily complicate bidding strategies, exposing
bidders attempting to create regional or national coverage areas to higher levels of risk than need
be the case. The efficiency of property rights assignments is therein reduced. It also leads to
relatively lengthy auctions that, combined with FCC non-disclosure rules, deter auction
participation -- perversely reducing competitive network entry.
U.S. spectrum policy is unique in its reliance on extreme license fragmentation. Virtually
all countries issue national licenses for mobile telephone service; a few countries issue large
regional licenses.
In economic terms, the (easily) most important wireless market is for mobile phones.
The FCC calls this Commercial Mobile Radio Services, or “CMRS,” and it includes cellular,
personal communications services (PCS), specialized mobile radio (SMR), advanced wireless
services (AWS) and 700 MHz licenses. The FCC created 734 local cellular franchise areas,
issuing two duopoly licenses in each. In PCS, multiple maps were used; A and B blocks
consisted of 51 licenses nationwide; C, D, E and F of 493 licenses – 2,074 licenses in all. Today,
including more than 47,000 SMR licenses (issued by local market and channel), there are at least
53,774 licenses used by U.S. mobile carriers. The equilibrium number of licenses appears to be
somewhere about four (meaning four combinations of thousands of elemental licenses), given
the fact that 90% percent of U.S. mobile service revenues are accounted for by Verizon, AT&T,
Sprint and T-Mobile.129
The formats adopted for license auctions have reflected the “fragmentation preferences”
of policy makers. Wireless operators bidding on licenses generally demand regional or
nationwide spectrum inputs. This makes licenses complements. On the other hand, the
existence of alternative license types within the same auction presents chances for substitution.
At a small cost penalty (in the added complexity in base station and handset radios), bidders can
aggregate licenses across bands to achieve their geographic coverage goals.
Taking this general spectrum allocation approach as a given, the economists who helped
craft FCC auction rules saw that simple bidding formats – such as sealed bids – would not
produce optimal results. Auctions would generate both greater revenue and more efficient
128
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results (resources going to the most efficient operators) were values of complements and
substitutes revealed as bids were being formulated. This led to the now familiar sequential
ascending auction (SAA) format, also known as a sequential, multi-round auction (SMR).130
Inefficiencies yet arise, however, due to risks bidders face in assembling complementary
sets of licenses. The solution to this problem is to include package (combinatorial) bids. The
FCC rejected this path in 1994, because combinatorial auctions have been thought to face
difficult computational issues, sometimes referred to by Michael Rothkopf as the 2N
bogeyman.131 Despite substantial improvements in auction software and numerous FCC
announcements (dating to 2000132) that it would adopt such methods,133 the Commission has yet
to widely deploy package bidding.134 Indeed, the combinatorial clock auction discussed in Porter
et al. (2003) has been shown to be highly efficient and does not needlessly suffer from the
dreaded bogeyman.
With such a mechanism, firms could bid for the set of licenses they desire. Otherwise,
they are forced to bid for each license individually, uncertain of the prices they will have to pay
to obtain complementary assets. This uncertainty is the source of “aggregation risk.”135 To
achieve national coverage, a new entrant must bid on scores of properties without knowing how
high prices will go. Should the firm emerge as the high bidder on a number of licenses, but then
see prices for complementary licenses climb higher than anticipated, it will be forced to make
difficult choices. Either it will exceed its budget, or attempt to exit the auction. The problem
with the latter is that there is no guarantee that it will be outbid on all licenses where it is
currently the provisional winning bidder. If it holds some fraction of its intended coverage map
when the auction ends, it’s best option may then be to liquidate at fire sale prices.
Rules to mitigate this effect—short of combinatorial auction forms that allow bidders to
select packages in real time—appear to have backfired. It has been shown that an FCC rule
allowing bid withdrawals (with penalties), designed to lessen the impact of failed aggregations,
actually results in more losses when licenses have strong complementarities.136 Hence, firms can
easily find themselves having to unload holdings at fire sale prices post-auction, or upping bids
to buy ‘fill-in’ licenses at higher prices than it estimated to be profitable. Firms can avoid either
position by simply choosing not to enter the auction in the first place.137
Hence, aggregation risk diminishes competitive bidding, lowering revenues and
potentially decreasing efficiency in the output market. One indication that this risk is substantial
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is seen in the premium generally paid for larger licenses where size is measured in license area
population (“pops”) or in frequency space (MHz), as in the 2006 AWS auction. See Figure 3.
Large regional licenses – D, E, F (12 licenses covering the U.S.) – generally sold for
substantially more than did smaller licenses – A (734 licenses), B (176), C (176).138 The F
block, with 20 MHz, sold for more than D and E blocks, allocated 10 MHz each. The larger B
and C licenses sold for more than did the smallest licenses, in A.
There was one important anomaly, however, in B license prices. The B band – 20 MHz
allocated to 176 licenses – was less expensive than the C band – with 10 MHz distributed across
176 licenses. The (176) B licenses were also cheaper than the (734) A licenses. Almost all B
licenses were won by SpectrumCo, a consortium of cable companies that held no existing
wireless assets. Bazelon (2009) argues that the AWS auction, including the small slicing of
licenses and the lack of package bidding, was efficient given that an entrant successfully
acquired 20 MHz of national coverage at a price of $2.4 billion – saving $1 billion to $1.5 billion
versus what the other two largest auction winners (T-Mobile and Verizon) paid. That was a
remarkable outcome.139
Bulow, Levin & Milgrom (2009) detail the bidding strategy of
SpectrumCo as highly successful, particularly its early use of a nine-increment jump bid (the
largest allowed under the AWS rules). From a social standpoint, however, such price
differentials suggest that the input market has yet to reflect competitive equilibrium. Auction
rules should invite bidders to purchase productive assets at competitive prices, not hire expensive
strategy consultants to overcome aggregation risk.140
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Fig. 2. Mean Prices for Different-Sized Licenses in the AWS Auction (Sept. 2006)
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Two basic policy reforms would promote further progress. The first, discussed above,
would provide for package bidding in auctions. The second entails further liberalization of
spectrum use, allowing market access – via liberal licenses -- to more bandwidth. This would
increase market liquidity, eliminating price differentials. Engorging the supply side would, of
course, extend productive opportunities and liquefy capital markets where wireless service
providers shop for spectrum inputs.141 We discuss the general efficiencies of this approach
below.
4. Under-allocation of Radio Spectrum Ownership Rights
License auctions do not reform the underlying resource allocation system. Hence, they
do not solve the essential social coordination problem confronted in Coase (1959): how to make
most efficient use of radio spectrum. That is because the rights auctioned by regulators are yet
created by administrative allocation, the state property regime imposed by policy makers on the
premise that “the invisible resource”142 did not admit to private ownership.
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The general liberalization of spectrum property rights is the more ambitious public policy
enterprise. While it has witnessed less decisive adoption than auctions, it has achieved more farreaching success in economic welfare terms. As in other countries, the FCC has afforded wide
discretion – what it calls “flexible use” – to licensees in particular cases, most notably in mobile
telecommunications service licenses.143 This has proven a powerful “proof of concept” for
spectrum property rights, Coase’s principal normative recommendation. Exclusive ownership
rights have been implemented without major strain (indeed, barely any institutional notice) on
the regulatory system. Competitive licensees, endowed with control of bandwidth, have
coordinated complex economic activities that would be less efficiently supplied under alternative
rules, ushering in waves of welfare-enhancing investment and innovation. There is no serious
opposition to the proposition that “flexible use” has offered substantial improvements over the
“command and control” mechanisms of the state property regime.144
Exclusive ownership rights enable spectrum markets to allocate bandwidth. Important
efficiency conditions are revealed. Trades are commonly made in bundled form, combining
airwave access with network services.145 Wireless carriers retain integrated control over
bandwidth and complementary communications infrastructure. Resources are nonetheless
shared, intensely. A mobile phone network will sell bundled access to millions of subscribers,
dozens of wireless service retailers (such as virtual network operators), and thousands of
application providers. These latter may contract directly with the network (as when customers of
Amazon download books on their Kindles, using the Sprint network but paying Amazon) or via
vendors setting up their own wireless platforms (as when 85,000 Apple App Store applications
come onto iPhones accessing the AT&T network via a contract with Apple).146
Administrative allocation yet imposes artificial scarcity. No more than about 12% of the
total bandwidth under 3.5 GHz (the most valuable frequencies) is thusly allocated in the U.S.147
Since the advent of auctions, which began with so-called second generation (2G) cellular
licenses in the mid-1990s, further allocations have been slow. In the early 2000s, the FCC
slowed the release of mobile licensed spectrum – 3G licenses – in favor of additional unlicensed
bandwidth.148 The Bush Administration explicitly delayed additional mobile license auctions in
143

Kwerel & Williams (2002); Hazlett & Spitzer (2006). The alert reader will note the irony in speaking of
“flexible use” in the context of licenses crafted to provide a specific set of services (like “cellular
telecommunications”). The Coasean path would lead to “spectrum licenses.”
144
FCC SPTFR (2002); Hatfield & Weiser (2006); Gerald R. Faulhaber, The Future of Wireless Communications:
Spectrum as a Critical Resource, 18 INFO ECON & POL’Y 256 (2006); Philip J. Weiser, The Untapped Promise of
Wireless Spectrum, Hamilton Project Paper 2008-08, Brookings Institution (July 2008).
145
Of course, ‘raw spectrum’ changes hands in the form of license sales, secondary market activity that has long
existed. Once networks are constructed, however, the ubiquitous business model is to retain spectrum control under
one organizational roof, and share bandwidth by selling bundled access rights.
146
Thomas W. Hazlett, Modular Confines of Mobile Networks: Is the iPhone iPhony? Paper presented at the
GMU/Microsoft Conference on Innovation (May 2009).
147
According to a survey of OECD members by the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association
(Summer 2009), the U.S. has authorized 409 MHz for use by wireless carriers. (Of this, 142 MHz were allocated to
licenses sold in 2006 and 2008, and the bandwidth has not yet been deployed. The AWS licenses auctioned in 2006
have incumbent clearing operations which continue to delay new mobile deployments.) This constitutes, 11.6% of
the prime bandwidth under 3.5 GHz. Only 50 MHz was identified as being “in the pipeline” for new FCC
authorizations.
148
Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communications, 82 TEX L R 863
(March 2004).
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early 2001 on the grounds that such delays would be a “win win.”149 The dual gains came from
helping wireless carriers, which claimed that they were then facing an economic downturn and
did not need more bandwidth, and government coffers, which were estimated to receive higher
revenues if sales were pushed back several years. Missing from this starving man theory of
restaurant management (the customers will pay more if you wait until they’re really hungry) was
any consideration of consumer welfare. Despite the explosive growth in wireless services and
burgeoning demand for spectrum inputs by carriers, the period 1996 through 2005 saw the
release of no new bandwidth for mobile services, constraining network expansion, as reflected in
the dearth of auction revenues generated during these years. See Figure 2.
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FIG. 2. FCC AUCTION REVENUES (EX AUCTIONS 5, 35) ($BIL.)150

Auctions 5 & 35

Moreover, U.S. regulators have reversed course on liberalization. For the 700 MHz
licenses, allocated UHF TV frequencies being abandoned by broadcasters with the analog
switch-off (completed June 2009), the FCC conditioned different regulatory regimes. Licenses
sold at auction were embedded with mandates to give priority to public safety communications
traffic, or to provide “open access” for all wireless devices and applications. These licenses
received sharply lower bids than licenses sold without such restrictions; indeed, the national “D”
license, allocated 10 MHz, received no bid at or above the reserve price, such that the bandwidth
continues to lie idle. The compatibility of old-style FCC micro-management with license
auctions was theoretically clear, and well stated in Coase (1959). But benefits of market
allocation are lost.

149

“To the industry’s relief, FCC Chairman Michael Powell, with the blessing of Secretary of Commerce Donald
Evans, recently halted a mandate from former President Clinton that would have required all government branches
to identify suitable 3G spectrum by July 30 of this year and auction it off by September 2002.” Lynette Luna,
Spectrum Quandary Puts 3G At Risk, TELEPHONY ONLINE (July 23, 2001). See also, Patrick Ross, Bush Wants to
Delay Airwave Auction, CNET NEWS.COM (April 9, 2001).
150
Source: FCC (see Appendix 1). Auction 5 (PCS C) produced bids that largely went uncollected. Auction 35
(PCS C re-auction) bids went entirely uncollected.
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Ironically, given their common normative roots, competitive bidding for licenses may
undermine spectrum liberalization. By eliminating the rents awarded to new licensees, auctions
tend to reduce the political demand for bandwidth supplements. Lacking more fundamental
reforms in the system of spectrum allocation, license auctions may make the regulatory regime
even more conservative.
a. Where’s the Bandwidth?
This tension flows from the regulator’s structurally passive role in spectrum allocation,
coupled with the bi-level nature of the regulatory process. First, spectrum allocations are
triggered by one or more interested parties formally requesting that the FCC accommodate new
services. Second, if the FCC acts, entrants must then obtain licenses created in the allocation.
There are risks of failure at either level; unless both the allocation and the license are obtained,
the entrant wastes any investment in promoting regulatory change.151
Under the comparative hearing system, there was an implicit property right awarded to
lobbyists for new allocations: if the Commission was persuaded to allocate spectrum for a new
service, those who had petitioned the agency to achieve this policy would likely stand first in
line, ahead of rival license applicants. With the switch to auctions, the queue is eliminated. The
returns to innovation are thereby reduced. That part of the innovation that is specific to
developing a new FCC allocation receives no payment. Competitors will free ride on the
innovator’s efforts, having equal standing in the auction.
License auctions are designed to eliminate wasteful rent seeking, a useful contribution.
But they may simultaneously reduce incentives for productive rent seeking.152 This lessens
pressure for spectrum allocations. The strategy of liberalization, of which license auctions are a
key component, may include offsets. The demonstration effect of market allocation of licenses
may itself propel reforms that generally enable more bandwidth to be used by market
participants. This may be observed in countries that have, in instituting auctions, jumped ahead
to also reform the underlying allocation regime.153
In the U.S., however, weakened pressure for new allocations, combined with political
arguments favoring revenue maximization, produced a spectrum drought, 1997-2006. The
spectrum lags did not go unnoticed; Congress mandated additional auctions, using TV band
spectrum, beginning in 2000. But the FCC, lobbied by incumbent carriers to delay new license
151

This scenario omits the possibility that the entrant seeks unlicensed spectrum, but can be easily extended to
encompass unlicensed allocations, however, which sharply increased in the U.S. following the introduction of
license auctions. This outcome was consistent with the rent seeking dynamics outlined here. As license rents were
taxed away in competitively bid assignments, relative returns to rent seeking for unlicensed allocations increased.
Rent seeking (or defending) activity by incumbents strategically intending to deter competitive entry via licensed
spectrum buttresses the effect.
152
The importance of rent seeking for the provision of valuable public goods was articulated in Dwight Lee, In
Defense of Excessive Government, 65 SO ECON J 674 (1999).
153
In addition to the statutory reforms instituted, 1989-1997, in Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala and El
Salvador, the U.K. and Norway have promoted spectrum liberalization through regulatory agency actions in recent
years. These policies attempt to allow private parties to bid for spectrum, not simply licenses allocated
administratively on a case-by-case basis.
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sales, postponed these auctions. The Bush Administration joined this dirigiste campaign in
2001. As Gerald Faulhaber wrote in 2006:
The sorry result is that cellular companies are straining within their bandwidth
restrictions and are unable to obtain new bandwidth to expand their business.
Meanwhile, large amounts of bandwidth are currently occupied by VHF and UHF
television broadcasters, even as the audience for broadcast-delivered TV
shrinks…154
When the de facto ban on bandwidth was lifted, the Sept. 2006 auction of AWS licenses
(allocated 90 MHz) and the March 2008 sale of 700 MHz licenses (allocated 52 MHz of UHF
TV frequencies) sold to hungry spectrum consumers who spent lavishly. Some $33 billion in
receipts was received by the U.S. Government – 62% of the total revenues collected from July
1994.
One consequence of the policy-imposed, decade-long spectrum drought period was a
merger wave. In 2004, there were six major nationwide carriers: Verizon, Cingular, AT&T
Wireless, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Nextel. In 2004-05, however, Cingular (a joint venture of SBC
and BellSouth) acquired AT&T Wireless for $41 billion, while Sprint bought Nextel for $35
billion. When the dust settled, four national carriers remained. The two combinations were both
driven, in large part, by a demand to access additional bandwidth; both networks launched 3G
upgrades post-merger.155 T-Mobile, which did not acquire additional significant spectrum during
the drought period, had to delay its 3G services156 until 2008, when its newly purchased
bandwidth – it was the largest winning bidder in the AWS auction, spending $4.2 billion on
licenses – enabled the roll-out of new high-speed data services with a network upgrade costing
$2.7 billion.157
The current spectrum holdings of the four national carriers are seen in Figure 3. By
aggregating licenses, network operators have assembled bandwidth blocks of consistent size
(and, although not shown, frequencies). The relentlessness of market incentives masks a good
deal of inefficiency. Thousands of secondary market transactions have contributed to these
holdings, as have many FCC auctions. Firms have devoted much energy, not to mention tens of
billions of dollars of investment capital, to acquiring these asset portfolios. Milgrom criticizes
the laissez-faire attitude that initial assignments do not matter much, so long as the rights are “in
the market.”158 It is a point worth making; institutions should be shaped to reduce such social
154

Faulhaber (2006), 262.
“Cingular Wireless, the nation's largest cellphone service provider, announced plans yesterday to upgrade its
high-speed data network, allowing faster downloads than are now available on many home broadband connections.
The upgrade will start at the end of 2005, and the network will be in place nationwide by 2006, Cingular said. .. In
October, Cingular Wireless closed its acquisition of AT&T Wireless, creating the nation's largest wireless company
with 47 million subscribers. Cingular said the acquisition gave it the additional radio spectrum necessary to deploy
the high-speed network.” Matt Richtel, Cingular to Upgrade Data Network, NY TIMES (Dec. 1, 2004).
156
“T-Mobile USA Inc. continues to lag behind its competitors in offering wide-area next-generation services, as
the carrier is still working on deploying EDGE services. The carrier also has stated it will be at least two years
before it has enough spectrum capacity to launch a UMTS-based network.” Dan Meyer, Verizon expands EV-DO,
Cingular says it's under no pressure to match speed, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (July 4, 2005).
157
Laurie Sullivan, T-Mobile Plans Major Cellular Upgrade To 3G, INFORMATION WEEK (Oct. 16, 2006).
158
Milgrom (2004), 19-21.
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expense. But, again, Coasean symmetry is called for. If auctions tend to delay the release of
additional bandwidth to market participants, gains from competitive bidding for licenses can be
swamped by the costs of idle spectrum. The slow flow of spectrum during the license auction
period in the U.S. is surely a cause for concern. The remedy is not in abandoning auctions, but
in structural reforms that push the auction more deeply into the spectrum allocation function.
FIG. 3. DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILE CARRIER BANDWIDTH159

B. De-liberalization.
Driven both by an intellectual consensus among economists160 and social demands to
adopt more efficient license distributions,161 U.S. spectrum allocation underwent a quiet but
striking period of deregulatory reform, 1975-2000. During that time private satellites were
authorized, cable TV operators were allowed to compete with broadcasters, content rules were
relaxed for radio and TV stations, satellite TV and radio operators were licensed, and cellular
and PCS licenses were issued. Spectrum policy was fundamentally altered in the liberalization
of mobile licenses; initially, cellular operators were mandated to provide a particular service with
a given (analog) technology, and the location of transmission facilities was fixed in the license.
By the time PCS permits were allocated in 1995, operators could select their own
(digital) technology, provide voice, data, or video services, and had wide latitude in choice of
business models. Disparate licenses – cellular, SMR, PCS – were unified under the CMRS
(Commercial Mobile Radio Service) regime, allowing flexibility to licensees and promoting
competition across otherwise disparate markets. The policy objective shifted from detailed
159

Source: Blair Levin, What 700 MHz Winners Can Do With Their Spectrum, Stifel Nicolas (April 15, 2008), 4.
T=AT&T; VZ=Verizon; S=Sprint.
160
See Gregory L. Rosston et al., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, Comment submitted to the Federal
Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 00-230 (Feb. 7, 2001).
161
For theoretical and empirical discussions of how spectrum policy has been reformed, see Hazlett (2001, 1998).
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specification of technology, equipment, network architecture, and service, to an effort to “license
spectrum.”
Yet the traditional administrative system for allocating spectrum rights remained in place.
And in recent years the political equilibrium at the FCC has retreated, slowing or reversing the
path to liberal licenses. Important policies that resulted include the allocation of a 50 MHz
“WiMax” band (3650-3700 MHz) for unlicensed rather than licensed use in 2005; the 700 MHz
C block “open access” rules adopted in 2007; the 700 MHz D block “public safety” license plan
adopted in 2007; and the TV band “white spaces” allocation for unlicensed devices (sharing the
294 MHz of “DTV spectrum”) in 2008.
• 3650-3700 MHz. A swath of 50 MHz adjacent to 3.5 GHz, the most popular international
band for emerging WiMax services, was set aside for unlicensed devices in a 2005
Order. The FCC rejected a proposal from Intel and Alvarion (ironically, two of the
largest manufacturing firms in the unlicensed device space) to largely allocate the
bandwidth to liberal licenses. Instead, it issued non-exclusive use rights while requiring
a registration system (to identify the location of transmissions) for users and mandating
that operators adopt reasonable “contention-based protocols” to mitigate interference.
This approach shifts the task of devising and regulating spectrum sharing etiquettes from
profit-maximizing firms to the government.162 As of mid-2009, the band supplied
virtually no subscriber services.163
• 700 MHz C License “Open Access” Rules. In crafting rules for the licenses to be
auctioned in 2008 the FCC determined that the winner of the 22 MHz C license (the
largest in the auction) would be obligated to provide non-discriminatory network access
for all devices and applications.164 This mandate leaves many details unanswered; it is
not clear how far prices and technologies – as distinct from Acceptable Use Policies –
may exclude devices or applications. Verizon won the C block, capturing a 60%
162

Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, STAN TECH L R (2007).
Maravedis data from 2Q2009 registered 1,600 subscribers of wireless broadband services in the band, all of
which were business customers. In contrast, 461,000 retail customers subscribed to Clearwire, offering service on
licensed 2.5 GHz airwaves obtained in secondary market transactions from original licensees.
164
The C Licensee is mandated by the FCC not to:
• Block, degrade, or interfere with the ability of end users to download and utilize applications of their choosing on
the licensee’s Block C network, subject to reasonable network management. Wireless service providers subject
to this requirement will not be allowed to disable features or functionality in handsets where such action is not
related to reasonable network management and protection, or compliance with applicable regulatory
requirements. For example, providers may not “lock” handsets to prevent their transfer from one system to
another.
• Block Wi-Fi access, MP3 playback ringtone capability, or other services that compete with wireless service
providers’ own offerings.
• Exclude applications or devices solely on the basis that such applications or devices would unreasonably increase
bandwidth demands.
• Impose any additional discriminatory charges (one-time or recurring) or conditions on customers who seek to use
devices or applications outside of those provided by the licensee.
• Deny access to a customer’s device solely because that device makes use of other wireless spectrum bands, such
as cellular or PCS spectrum.
Bingham Law firm summary (Aug. 15, 2007); http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=5492.
163
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discount attributed, in substantial measure, to the regulatory liability assumed.165 If the
discount resulted in superior retail market performance, it could well be justified. Yet,
as seen in the current rivalry between RIM Blackberry, Apple iPhone, and Google
gPhone, platform competitive business models locate across an “open–closed”
continuum.166 It is not the case that “open” access models invariably outperform; it is
clearly the case that some “closed” platforms drive rivalry and deliver consumer
benefits. Categorical restrictions by regulators diminish rivalry, tax the innovative
process, and foreclose valuable options. This approach re-institutes the license rigidities
of traditional spectrum regulation.
• 700 MHz D Block. The FCC imposed expensive obligations on the 10 MHz D license,
requiring the winning bidder to give priority access to public safety agencies (fire,
police, emergency ‘first responders’) in a hybrid (commercial/public safety) wireless
network. Extensive build-out obligations were also imposed, requiring network
coverage of 75% of U.S. population by 2013, 95% by 2016 and 99.3% by 2019. No bid
exceeded the reserve price of $1.3 billion. At the mean price/MHz-pop for A, B, C, and
E licenses, D would have generated $3.9 billion. Instead, 10 MHz lies dormant.

In the 700 MHz license auction concluded in March 2008, the underlying spectrum was
virtually identical across properties.167 Yet price variances were very large. See Table 3. The C
block sold for 29% of the adjusted price of the B block despite the aggregation premium on the
larger-bandwidth C licenses. The C licenses, at B prices, would have cost Verizon nearly $16.6
billion -- $11.8 billion more. Of course, the D license did not sell, even at a reserve price onethird of the average obtained for the other licenses. This is evidence that regulatory rules and
spectrum allocation procedures continue to distort markets. Bandwidth continues to be allocated
not to where consumers desire it to be used, but where administrative mechanisms steer it.168

165

Verizon paid $4.7 billion for licenses allocated 22 MHz of nationwide spectrum; at the mean prices for the
other comparable licenses sold in the auction (the A and B licenses also having paired spectrum) it would have paid
$11.8 billion, or 2.5 times as much.
166
Thomas W. Hazlett, Modularity of Mobile Networks: Is the iPhone iPhony? Paper presented at the
Microsoft/GMU Conference on Innovation (May 7, 2009).
167
Boundary conditions were a bit different. The A licenses were allocated spectrum adjacent to TV Channel 51,
e.g., where digital television broadcasts would cause some conflicts in (relatively few) markets where such TV
stations broadcast. Another difference was that the E license was offered as a single “block” and not as “paired”
spectrum. This, however, reflects administrative discretion.
168
In placing “open access” requirements on the C license, FCC policy makers effectively allocated spectrum for
the benefit of application providers like Google that lobbied for the rules. By allowing such firms to direct resources
without absorbing the costs of the resulting allocation, free rider problems emerge. See Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe
Lopomo & Leslie Marx, The ‘Google Effect’ in the FCC’s 700 MHz Auction, 21 INFORMATION ECONOMICS &
POLICY 101 (2009).
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Table 3. Average Prices for Different Licenses in 700 MHz Auction (March 2008)
Block

Net Winning Bids ($)
3,875,663,800
9,068,382,850
4,746,691,000
1,266,844,500
18,957,582,150

A
B
C
E
TOTAL

MHz * Pops
3,419,018,088
3,419,018,088
6,283,649,790
1,713,722,670
14,833,358,892

$/MHz/pop
1.13
2.65
0.76
0.74
1.28

Source: Blair Levin, Special Focus: The Wireless World After 700 MHz, Stifel Nicolas (March, 2008), p. 4.

The degree to which the regulatory system distorts spectrum values is suggested in Figure
4, showing the price (adjusted for MHz and population in the licensed areas) paid across U.S.
auctions divided by the mean price paid across all auctions.169 CMRS licenses, embedding a
(mostly) homogeneous set of licensee property rights, are denoted, and exhibit less variance than
the non-CMRS sample. See also Table 4. Although economic factors, including overall market
conditions and frequency location, alter bids over time, the extreme variance in FCC license
prices is difficult to explain by changing economic circumstances alone. The distinct nature of
the rights granted in different licenses, the manner in which spectrum is divvied up (or
channelized), and the credits extended to certain auction participants have served to create large
price variance.
FIG. 4. PRICE/MHZ/POP ACROSS U.S. LICENSE AUCTIONS, 1994-2008
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There have been 72 FCC auctions; the mean price per MHz-pop (equally weighted across auctions) is 23.17¢.
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Table 4. FCC License Auction Prices: Means and Standard Deviations

Mean Price per MHz ($)
Std. Dev. ($)

All Auctions
0.46
1.51

CMRS Auctions
1.16
1.19

Non-CMRS Auctions
0.33
1.54

Certain licenses have been embedded with broad, flexible spectrum use rights that permit
licensees to determine services, business models, and technologies. In general, licenses used for
mobile voice and data services have been liberally endowed.170 The Coasean vision of
functioning, efficient spectrum markets are thereby supported – and observed. Most spectrum,
however, continues to be allocated in highly restrictive ways, either bottled up in little used
government allocations or dedicated to traditional licenses granting sharply truncated spectrum
property rights.
That regulators seek to promote different services with different licenses constitutes an
industrial policy Gerald Faulhaber and David Farber dub “GOSPLAN.”171 Satellite radio
licenses, for example, permit only national broadcasts; targeted, localized content is prohibited
(to protect terrestrial radio stations). Satellite telephone operators are permitted to provide
“ancillary terrestrial” mobile services only to augment satellite phone service, despite the fact
that “land mobile” is likely to be the most efficient use of the band. Guard bands in 700 MHz
frequencies have been heavily regulated, with licensees permitted only to operate on a common
carriage model imposed by the Commission. The rules have proven unworkable, destroying the
value of otherwise productive frequencies.172
License auctions appear to have exacerbated the tendency of spectrum misallocation
under the regulatory regime, but the hypothesis is testable. The simpler point made here is that
competitive bidding for licenses is easily compatible with a policy regime in which spectrum is
allocated as state property. Absent more fundamental reforms, the “price system” will continue
to be stymied in its effort to efficiently allocate radio spectrum.

170

Kwerel & Williams (2002).
Faulhaber (2006), 265.
172
Gregory L. Rosston, The Long and Winding Road: The FCC Paves the Path With Good Intentions, 27 TELECOM
POL’Y 501 (Aug. 2003).
171
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VI. CONCLUSION
When Ronald Coase began his investigation of the regulation of radio waves, the
consensus view was that spillovers in the use of a resource disqualified markets as the efficient
form of social organization. Only the unified control exerted by an administrative agency of the
state could take into account the conflicts between rival users. Regulators, judges and industry
experts agreed.
Coase wondered why the coordination commonly seen in market transactions would fail
to obtain. Using the assumptions of prevailing economic models, he reasoned that they would
not: if private actors were as perfectly informed as were government regulators, they would set
ownership rules so as to maximize the value of output, sharing the gains. When the obscuring
assumption of perfect information was relaxed, then the source of coordination problems became
clear: ownership rights were not sufficiently established to permit the cooperation routinely
exhibited elsewhere in the economy.
Coase (1959) is best known as an advocacy essay promoting FCC license auctions.
Derided at first, the policy suggestion was eventually adopted in the U.S. by congressional
statute in 1993. Competitive bidding commenced the following year, capturing about $52 billion
in federal receipts in the years since. By rule of thumb, Coase’s reform has generated at least
$17 billion in efficiency gains (via reductions in tax distortions), placing him in the company of
those rare scholars who can easily document the positive net social value of their research
agenda.
Yet this seminal paper was actually not a polemic, and spectrum auctions not its principal
legacy. What Coase fundamentally contributed was a symmetric analysis of property regime
choices, explaining how the costs of the “price system” were real, but that so were the costs of
any alternative. The administrative allocation system, by restricting productive activities, was
also costly, and yet revealed none of the price information that would come from property
owners pursuing gains from trade. Lacking such data, resource allocation would be an exercise
in the dark.
Coase argued for analytical symmetry on logical grounds, and then expressed an
expectation that private property would outperform state property given the rich empirical
history of competing systems. He was open to correction; he, in fact, had little spectrum market
evidence to distinguish the most efficient path. But the “invisible hand” generally worked.
Why not here? He became convinced that the general case would obtain in the special case of
radio spectrum when the arguments for administrative control were made. They were
“incredibly feeble,” and easily refuted by a law student who had fortuitously read Abba Lerner as
an undergraduate.173
Thanks to changing technologies, evolving political equilibria, and the intellectual
consensus that Coase fundamentally reshaped, policy makers around the globe have begun
treating the spectrum allocated to mobile telecommunications licenses as de facto private
173

Coase (1993), p. 249.
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property. Decades of experience with comparative spectrum ownership institutions are now
available for observation. The liberalization of private property rights has yielded extremely
large social gains, permitting complex market structures to develop. No other form of spectrum
allocation, including the “command and control” once thought necessary to avoid tragedy of the
commons or the “spectrum commons” recently heralded as the obsolescence of Coasean property
rights, supports such productive social coordination.
In this environment, new and interesting problems have appeared. Foremost among them
is the apparent conflict between license auctions and efficiency in spectrum allocation. Where
the price system is instituted to assign rights crafted under a non-market system, claimants bid
competitively and rents are captured by the state. Rights assignments are more efficient, but
dynamic pressure for the creation of new rights is reduced. Eliminating wasteful rent seeking,
and the misallocations designed to attract it, saves society resources. But a good measure of
productive rent seeking has been eliminated, as well. Spectrum policy makers may become less
subject to pressures for market entry.
While market allocation of radio spectrum, tried and tested, generally out-performs
administrative allocation, U.S. policy makers have remained in control of new spectrum
allocations and may have become even more conservative. Consumers, innovators, and a host
of industries visibly benefit from liberalization and would further gain from its extension. The
rivalry between these competing political forces will yet determine whether the disruptive clarity
of Ronald Coase will continue to drive spectrum property reforms to further frontiers of
efficiency.
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APPENDIX 1. FCC WIRELESS LICENSE AUCTIONS
No.

Auction Name

Auction Date
7/25/1994 - 7/29/1994

Length
(Days)
5

Licenses
Sold

1

Nationwide Narrowband PCS

10

2

Interactive Video & Data Services

3

Regional Narrowband PCS

4

Broadband PCS A & B

12/5/1994 - 3/13/1995

60

5

Broadband PCS C

12/18/1995 - 5/6/1996

83

6

Multipoint/Multichannel Distr.Services

11/13/1995 - 3/28/1996

75

7

900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio

12/5/1995 - 4/15/1996

8

Direct Broadcast Satellite 110°

9

Direct Broadcast Satellite 148°

10

Broadband PCS C (Re-auction)

7/3/1996 - 7/16/1996

8

11

Broadband PCS D, E, F

8/29/1996 - 1/14/1997

85

12

Cellular Unserved

1/13/1997 - 1/21/1997

6

14

14

Wireless Communications Service

4/15/1997 - 4/25/1997

9

15

Digital Audio Radio Service

4/1/1997 - 4/2/1997

2

16

800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio

10/28/1997 - 12/8/1997

17

Local Multipoint Distribution System

18

220 MHz

20

VHF Public Coast

21

Location and Monitoring Service

22

Total Revenue
(Net Bids - $)
650,306,674

Total
MHz

Price per MHzPop

0.7875

3.158716

7/28/1994 - 7/29/1994

2

594

213,892,375

1

0.81816

10/26/1994 - 11/8/1994

9

130

392,706,797

0.45

10.68398

99

7,721,184,171

60

0.487617

493

10,071,708,842

30

1.260233

493

216,239,603

78

0.886594

79

1020

204,267,144

10

0.077401

1/24/1996 - 1/25/1996

1.5

1

682,500,000

N/a

N/a

1/25/1996 - 1/26/1996

1.5

1

52,295,000

500

0.000393

18

904,607,467

30

0.11319

1472(a)

2,517,439,565

30

0.312032

1,842,533

N/a

N/a

126(b)

13,638,940

30

0.001691

2

173,234,888

25

0.025767

27

524

96,232,060

10

0.035783

2/18/1998 - 3/25/1998

26

864

578,663,029

1300

0.00164

9/15/1998 - 10/22/1998

26

693

21,650,301

N/a

N/a

12/3/1998 - 12/14/1998

8

26(c)

7,459,200

0.05

0.549709

2/23/1999 - 3/5/1999

9

289

3,438,294

14

0.000897

Block Broadband PCS C, D, E, F

3/23/1999 - 4/15/1999

17

302(d)

412,840,945

50

0.030153

23

LMDS Re-auction

4/27/1999 - 5/12/1999

12

161

45,064,450

1300

0.000127

24

220 MHz

6/8/1999 - 6-30-1999

17

222

1,924,950

1.55

0.004535

25

Closed Broadcast

9/28/1999 - 10/8/1999

9

115

57,820,350

N/a

N/a

27

Broadcast Auction

10/6/1999 - 10/8/1999

3

1

172,250

0.2

0.003145

26

929 & 931 MHz Paging Service

2/24/2000 - 3/2/2000

6

985

4,122,500

2

0.007324

28

Broadcast Auction

30

39 GHz

80

Blanco Texas Broadcast

3/21/2000 - 3/24/2000

4

2

1,210,000

12

0.000358

4/12/2000 - 5/8/2000

19

2173

410,649,085

1400

0.001042

7/12/2000 - 7/14/2000

3

1

18,798,000

N/a

N/a

33

Upper 700 MHz Guard Bands

9/6/2000 - 9/21/2000

12

96

519,892,575

6

0.307896

34

800 MHz SMR General Category

8/16/2000 - 9/1/2000

13

1030

319,451,810

1293.8

0.000877

36

800 MHz SMR Lower 80 Channels

35

C & F Block Broadband PCS

38

Upper 700 MHz Guard Bands (2001)

39

VHF Public Coast Location Monitoring

6/6/2001 - 6/13/2001

6

40

Paging

10/30/2001 - 12/5/2001

24

41

Narrowband PCS

8

42

Multiple Address Systems Spectrum

10/3/2001 - 10/16/2001
11/14/2001 11/27/2001

43

Mult-Radio Service

82

New Analog Television Stations

44

Lower 700 MHz Band (2002)

45

Cellular RSA

32

New AM Broadcast Stations

46

1670-1675 MHz Nationwide License

11/1/2000 - 12/5/2000

22

2800

28,978,385

4

4.37

12/12/2000 - 1/26/2001

24

422

16,857,046,150

70

0.845567

2/13/2001 - 2/21/2001

6

8

20,961,500

6

0.012267

217

1,144,755

14.05

0.000286

5323

12,897,127

2.12

0.021361

317

8,285,036

1.8625

0.015619

8

878(e)

1,202,725

0.825

0.005119

1/10/2002 - 1/17/2002

6

27(f)

1,548,225

30.5

0.000176

2/5/2002 - 2/13/2002

5

4

5,025,250

24

0.000726

8/27/2002 - 9/18/2002

16

484

88,651,630

18

0.017079

5/29/2002 - 6/4/2002
12/10/2002 12/12/2002

5

3

15,871,000

N/a

N/a

3

3

1,520,375

0.03

0.175744

4/30/2003

1

1

12,628,000

5

0.008685
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48

Lower and Upper Paging Bands

5/13/2003 - 5/28/2003

11

2832

2,445,608

N/a

N/a

49

Lower 700 MHz Band (2003)

5/28/2003 - 6/13/2003

13

251

56,815,960

18

0.010854

54

Closed Broadcast (2003)

7/23/2003 - 7/29/2003

5

4

4,657,600

N/a

N/a

50

Narrowband PCS (2003)

9/24/2003 - 9/29/2003

4

48

428,709

0.6625

0.002225

51

Regional Narrowband (PCS) (2003)

9/24/2003 - 9/25/2003

2

5

134,250

0.125

0.003693

52

Direct Broadcast Satellite Service

7/14/2004

1

3

12,200,000

N/a

N/a

53

Multichannel Video Distribution & Data

1/14/2004 - 1/27/2004

9

192

118,721,835

96000

4.21E-06

55

900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio

2/11/2004 - 2/25/2004

10

55

4,861,020

5

0.003311

56

24 GHz Service

7/28/2004

1

7

216,050

400

1.84E-06

57

Automated Maritime Telecom. System

9/15/2004

1

10

1,057,365

2

0.0018

37

FM Broadcast

11/3/2004 - 11/23/2004

14

258

147,876,075

51.6

0.009759

58

Broadband PCS (re-auction)

1/26/2005 - 2/15/2005

15

217

2,043,230,450

120

0.057444

59

Multiple Address Systems Spectrum

4/26/2005 - 5/18/2005

17

2223

3,865,515

0.7

0.01863

60

Lower 700 MHz Band

7/20/2005 - 7/26/2005

5

5

305,155

12

8.58E-05

61

Automated Maritime Telecom. System

8/3/2005 - 8/17/2005

11

10

7,094,350

2

0.011967

81

Low Power Television (LPTV)

63

Multichannel Video Distribution & Data

9/14/2005 - 9/26/2005

9

90

834,600

540

5.21E-06

12/7/2005

1

22

133,160

11000

4.08E-08

62

FM Broadcast (2006)

1/12/2006 - 1/31/2006

13

163

54,259,600

32.6

0.005559

64

Full Power TV Construction Permits

3/15/2006 - 3/20/2006

4

10

23,367,850

60

0.001301

65

800 MHz Air-Ground Radiotelephone

5/10/2006 - 6/2/2006

15

2

38,339,000

N/a

N/a

66

Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1)

8/9/2006 - 9/18/2006

28

1087

13,700,267,150

90

0.508437

68

FM Broadcast (1/2007)

69

1.4 GHz Bands

70
71

1/10/2007 - 1/17/2007

5

9

3,264,250

1.8

0.006012

2/7/2007 - 3/8/2007

21

64

123,599,000

8

0.051223

FM Broadcast (3/2007)

3/7/2007 - 3/26/2007

14

111

21,301,175

22.2

0.003181

Broadband PCS (2007)

5/16/2007 - 5/21/2007

4

33

13,932,150

120

0.000385

72

220 MHz

6/20/2007 - 6/26/2007

5

76

185,416

0.25

0.002459

73

700 MHz Band

1/24/2008 - 3/18/2008

38

1090(g)

18,957,582,150

52

1.199004

77

Closed Cellular Unserved

6/17/2008

1

1

25,002

N/A

N/a

78

AWS-1 & Broadband PCS

8/13/2008 - 8/20/2008

6

53

21,276,850

165

0.000424

85

LPTV & TV Translator Digital Channels

11/5/2008 - 11/10/2008

4

30

134,725

180

2.46E-06

Average auction length

14.49

Average Price per MHz-pop

0.231747

Total Licenses

27,484

Total Winning Bids

77,998,345,602

Total Revenue Collected

52,621,436,577

Uncollected Revenue
Percent of High Bids Uncollected

25,376,909,025
32.54

a) Data comes from Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, and Paul Milgrom. 2009 "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions", National Bureau of
Economic Research.

